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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding, in 
effect, that the Utah Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of the 
proceedings when Respondent did not provide Appellant with a 
timely notice of appeal, in violation of Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding, in 
effect, that the brief filed by Respondent on March 1 was timely 
and should not be stricken, and that her appeal should not be 
dismissed, where the brief was not filed timely in light of the 
fact that the Court of Appeals denied Respondent's second 
request for an extension of time? 
3. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding, in 
effect, that the Utah Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to 
consider the trial court's denial of Respondent's Rule 60(b) 
motion to set aside the order against Respondent, where 
Respondent failed to appeal such order? 
4. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding, in 
effect, that the trial court abused its discretion in granting 
Appellant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit brought by Respondent, 
where, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court 
was justified in dismissing this suit? 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Gee v, Zuehlke, Slip Opinion, Case No. 890718-CA 
(dated November 21, 1990). See Appendix A. 
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JURISDICTION 
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to allow 
the Utah Supreme Court to review the Utah Court of Appeals' 
reversal, entered November 21, 1990, of an order granting 
Appellant's motion to dismiss, such order being granted by 
Honorable Richard Moffat of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) of the Utah Code. 
See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1987). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for 
special and important reasons. The following, while neither 
controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's discretion, 
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
— has decided a question of state or federal 
law in a way that is in conflict with a 
decision of the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or 
federal which has not been, but should be, 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
Utah R. App. P. 46. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a personal injury action based upon a 
traffic accident which occurred on or about June 23, 1984. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
Below and Statement of Facts. 
Because the relevant facts in this particular appeal 
concern the course of proceedings and disposition below, these 
two sections will be combined into one section for the purposes 
of this appeal. 
On or about July 15, 1985, Plaintiff/Respondent 
Nancy Gee (hereinafter "Respondent Gee") filed a complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court against Defendant/Appellant 
Angela M. Zuehlke (hereinafter "Appellant Zuehlke"). On 
June 27, 1989, the trial court entered an order requiring 
Respondent Gee to submit to an independent medical examination 
scheduled for June 29, 1989. Respondent Gee unreasonably and 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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knowingly refused to cooperate with the independent medical 
examiner in the performance of the independent medical 
examination ordered by the Court. Thereafter, on or about 
July 3, 1989, counsel for Appellant Zuehlke filed a motion for 
sanctions and protective order and a memorandum supporting such, 
seeking, among other things, that Respondent Gee's complaint be 
dismissed for failure to comply with the order for examination. 
After Respondent Gee filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion for sanctions and protective order, an evidentiary 
hearing was held on such motion on July 14, 1989. The court 
heard testimony from Dr. Lincoln Clark and Respondent Gee, and 
entered, later that day, an order granting Appellant's motion to 
dismiss Respondent's complaint. On August 14, 1989, Respondent 
Gee filed a notice of appeal. On August 21, 1989, Respondent 
Gee filed a motion to set aside dismissal, pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 4, 1989, 
the trial court denied Respondent's motion to set aside 
dismissal. That decision was not appealed by Respondent Gee. 
On November 1, 1989, Appellant moved the Utah Supreme Court for 
an order for summary disposition, which was denied by the Utah 
Supreme Court in its order dated November 20, 1989. At that 
time, the Utah Supreme Court set January 2, 1990 as the due date 
for Respondent Gee's brief. After the case was transferred over 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition in accordance with 
the order of the Utah Supreme Court dated December 15, 1989, 
counsel for Respondent Gee moved ex parte for an order allowing 
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a "Th i i;» IIK »t i ( m w a s I i 11 "(111 
on December 26, 1 9 89, ai ici was i lot objected to by Appellant 
Zuehlke• Respondent Gee's motion for an extension of time was 
granted, which gai 'i» liei mil i I Kebruarj "', m\H\ In file "l er 
brief. On January 30, 1990, Respondent Gee once again moved > 
p a r t e f n i ii iiinill n iiii I! i ," , ' -»•• g e m e n t " ' * i IIIIIP I n (" i 1 n h e r h i ir-,-f. 
This second motion for ^  extension . ime was objected to by 
Appellant Zuehlke on February ** <)n February 22, 1990, 
t h e Utal l Cc " L : I :: f fi ppe* : J i j i i y e i N<*qn<i I W \ ) t \ r l f , 
denied Appellant's motion for second 30-day extension, 
specifically noting that the reasons •• Respondent Gee * counsel 
f ,r ;- M.:i-
Appellant Zuehlke submitted motion to strike t i * brief O-F 
Respondent Gee and a motion • dismiss the appeal un m e Ddsis 
that since the Court had denied Respondent Gee's second request 
for extension >f ti me, Respondent Gee's brief served upon 
App« 
stricken further . . iccordance with the Rules of this Court, 
Appellant Zuehlke submitted „J,II order dismissing the appeal 
t * - M »iii I i 1 ecj. That in< r. 
was denied * ionorable Regnal arff i.n his order dated 
March November '*- ;he matter being before 
t 11 i i Ii Nil I i"s I ml Appe I idte 
Procedure zu*> it v i.-* \ppeals ordered that "the order 
granting defendant s motion sn, .- i«, reversed , 
This decision was issued without opinion. 
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ARGUMENT 
Appellant Zuehlke petitions the Utah Supreme Court for 
a writ of certiorari to review various errors the Utah Court of 
Appeals made in reversing the trial court's order granting 
Appellant Zuehlke's motion to dismiss. The Utah Supreme Court 
has indicated in Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure that a writ of certiorari will be granted only for 
special and important reasons. Utah R. App. P. 46. Some of the 
reasons that indicate the character of reasons that will be 
considered by the Utah Supreme Court in reviewing a writ of 
certiorari are listed in Rule 46 and are set forth above in the 
section entitled "Controlling Provisions" of this brief. 
In reversing the trial court's order granting 
Appellant Zuehlke's motion to dismiss, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in effect: rendered a decision that is in conflict 
with other decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah 
Supreme Court; departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings so as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision; and decided an important 
question of state law which has not yet been, but should bef 
settled by the Supreme Court. These errors made by the Utah 
Court of Appeals are discussed below in separate points. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S ORIGINAL APPEAL SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION DUE 
TO DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T h e 111 d I in i in mi in ! 11 I i\ p | M \ i I s i • i >inm i t L e d e r v 111 I i y 
dismissing Respondent Gees original appeal for lack 
jurisdiction due to Respondent Gee's defective notice * appeal. 
T h e d p p l i t ' d l i h " 1 I  «n,i ill I  h i . i | IL i i n l H u . l e 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; i states that ' ;iv ;o *\ 
taking the appeal shall give notice :.ne tiling of a notice ui 
appeal by servi ng personal! y or mo ir»a * copy thereof t-n 
counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order 
:
 in 
• in • 
Turning to the facts of the case at bar, Judge Moffat 
entered h ; •-• order granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion > dismiss 
o . < II 98 ft ppel ] c -!h I k .e 
received an unsigned, undated Notice of Intent Appeal 
(attached as Appendix B ) , which was not the actual notice of 
appeal filed with I In* t final court. Th .i s siotice o f Intent to 
Appeal was Appellant Zuehlke's only notice from Respondent Gee; 
and Appellant Zuehlke was unaware that Respondent Gee hi 
actually fIled a Notice o* Appeal with the trial court until 
Appellant Zuehlke received a copy of Respondent Gee's Docketing 
S *\ ^m^i • , I in "I utIPi "}l\ , ! H\tH 
A Notice . .ntent Appeal i s not authorized or 
recognized I the Utah Rules - Appellate Procedure An 
incline h ,•<• , :>y i I «s v e r y iidl ur'f1,, o n l y 
informed the Appellant Zuehlke that Respondent intended to 
appeal sometime, but did place Appellant Zuehlke on actual 
notice of 1:1 le Noti np \ppeal. 
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Of particular concern is the fact that the notice 
contained in the record of the trial court, found at page 438, 
indicates that a Notice of Appeal was filed with the court. The 
notice is accompanied by a mailing certificate wherein counsel 
for Respondent Gee indicates that he caused a "true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Intent to Appeal to be mailed." 
A review of Appendix B, which is the actual Notice received by 
Appellant Zuehlke, indicates that, in spite of Respondent Gee's 
counsel's representation to the contrary, a true and exact copy 
was not mailed. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the 
issue regarding the failure of a party to notify the opposing 
party of notice of appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals has dealt 
specifically with that issue in the case of Thornton v. Slack, 
719 P.2d 66 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). Based upon the Oregon Rules, 
which appear to be similar to Rule 3(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Court held that the failure to serve 
actual notice on all parties who have appeared in the action was 
jurisdictional, thus requiring a dismissal of the appeal. Id. 
at 67. 
There is no dispute that the only indication of the 
appeal received by Appellant Zuehlke was an unsigned, undated 
Notice of Intent to Appeal, which was not the actual notice 
filed with the court. Under these circumstances, the Utah Court 
of Appeals should have dismissed Respondent Gee's original 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. By reversing the trial court's 
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n n i t ' i q t * a n l iiii<| il i sin i ss»<i I I in1 III a h i ' o u r l I A p p e d I s ill e l l e r t , 
rendered i e c i s i o n that was in c o n f l i c t with Rule 3(e) of the 
Utah Rules Appel late Procedure, However, even assuming that 
t - in i in t lii i s retjcinil li 11 li I llllii iy 
did, the issue as to whether the failure of a party to notify an 
opposing party of notice of appeal requires the dismissal of the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction i s ai i important question of 
state law which has not been, but should be, settled by the 
Supreme Cou rl .1 \\ ""i ord 1 nig 1 y t In 11> Court: shou I d qi."*ii"il Appe I I «"iiiit 
Zuehlke's petition for review by a writ of certiorari. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT GEE'S ORIGINAL APPEAL SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE BRIEF FILED BY 
RESPONDENT GEE ON MARCH 1 WAS UNTIMELY AND 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRICKEN DUE TO THE FACT 
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED RESPONDENT 
GEE'S SECOND REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF 
TIME. 
The Cour^ Appea]r - : failing t dismiss 
Respondent Gee's 
Respondent Gee o itimely and should have been 
stricken The applicable law on this point is found ID Rule 26 
o f I lliH III1 1) II in It mi in II i • K ni l A p p H I i l l r« t. l ic i t mi 11 ! 1' | i n u v I < 1 H K „ M I p e r ! i i n e n l 
part: 
(a) Time for serving and filing briefs. The 
appellant shall serve and file a brief 
within 40 days after date of notice from the 
clerk of the appellate court pursuant to 
Rule 13 By stipulation filed with 
the court, the parties may extend each of 
such periods for no more than 30 days in 
civil cases 
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(c) Consequence of failure to file briefs. 
If an appellant fails to file a brief within 
the time provided in this rule, or within 
the time as may be extended by order of the 
appellate court, an appellee may move for 
dismissal of the appeal. 
Utah R. App. P. 26. 
Turning to the facts of this case, the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, particularly Rule 26, require that 
Respondent Gee's brief to the Court of Appeals be filed within 
the time allotted by the Rules or such other further time as the 
court may allow. See, Id. As indicated in the Statement of 
Facts above, the Utah Court of Appeals denied Respondent Gee's 
second motion for an extension of time; accordingly, the brief 
filed by the Respondent Gee on March 2 was untimely and should 
have been stricken. Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals' decision 
to reverse the trial court was, in effect, in conflict with Rule 
26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Because Respondent Gee's brief should have been 
stricken, and because Rule 26(c) provides that if an appellant 
fails to file a brief within the time provided in this Rule, or 
within the time as may be extended by order of the appellate 
court, an appellee may move for dismissal of the appeal, and 
because Appellant Zuehlke did move the Court of Appeals for 
dismissal of the appeal, the Court of Appeals erred by failing 
to grant such dismissal. Filing a late brief, in accordance 
with Rule 26, has the same effect as if the appellant had filed 
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dismissed by operation * Thus, indicated above, 
the Utah Court of Appeals erred fa \ r • a t o dismiss Respondent 
Gee • s ori gi i la J appea„ - • I he I awb 
of this state and i s so far a departure from the accepted and 
usual course 01 judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise 
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision Accordingly, this 
Court should grant Appellant Zuehlke F petition for review by a 
w 
POINT III 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY FAILING 
TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
RESPONDENT GEE'S ORIGINAL APPEAL OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF RESPONDENT GEE'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT. 
Because the order of reversal **• the Utah Court ui 
Appeals was issued * t- «T\ opinion, * « unclear as ^ 
whether or n.-t t. u\ reversed .he trial court order granting 
Defendant • s " i •. > i ::)] : t:l : .€ • 
Respondent Gee' K motion to set as: * *-* asmissa i -•-
Rule 60(b) the Utah Rules of Civi Procedure. • r <>* 
w "i i ie • 
reverse the t r i a l court denial of Respondent Gee's motion 
set aside the dismissal under Rule 60(t * *, court's 
o r d e r cji"cini i nc] A p p e l l f i n t 'Ziiclli I llu' "' "i mot - m n t I I I! 
of th i s brief i s devoted to the argument that the Utah Court of 
Appeals erred in reversing the t r i a l court's denial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Respondent Gee's motion to set aside dismissal, assuming such 
was the basis of their reversal. 
As has been previously indicated, the only Notice of 
Appeal which appears in the court record is that notice 
appearing at page 438 of the record, dated August 14, 1989. The 
trial court below denied Appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Dismissal by its order dated October 4, 1989. (Record 462.) 
After that denial, there is no notice of appeal or further 
indication of any intent to appeal the decision of the trial 
court denying relief under Rule 60(b). 
This Court has previously dealt with the very issue of 
the appeal of orders entered pursuant to Rule 60(b). In the 
case of Baker v. Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of 
Rule 60(b) motions pending while the appellant simultaneously 
appealed the trial court's decision. The Baker court held that 
trial courts have jurisdiction to hear Rule 60(b) motions while 
an appeal is pending; the court specifically held that denial of 
Rule 60(b) relief constitutes a final order and that if that 
Rule 60(b) relief is denied, then the parties may appeal the 
Rule 60(b) relief sought. 
Specifically in regards to this issue, the Utah Court 
of Appeals stated in Baker: 
We hold that if the district court finds the 
motion to be without merit, it may enter an 
order denying the motion, and the parties 
may appeal from that order. 
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Baker, 757 P.2d at 880. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has also dealt with this 
issue in the case of Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
950 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). In the Amica case, the appellant 
appealed certain rulings of the trial court and then proceeded 
with a Rule 60(b) motion. The Court of Appeals specifically 
indicated that Schettler did not appeal the trial court's denial 
of his Rule 60(b) motion in a separate notice of appeal. Id. at 
968. The Court went on to indicate: 
Finally we hold that the trial court's order 
of June 24, 1987, denying Schettler's 60(b) 
motion was a final appealable order, and 
since Schettler has not timely appealed that 
order, we need not address whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion for relief from final judgment. 
Id. 
The same circumstances exist in this case as did in 
the Amica case, supra, in that Respondent Gee's only indication 
of an intent to appeal was a notice to appeal the dismissal of 
the initial order granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion to 
dismiss. There was no timely notice of appeal filed regarding 
the trial court's denial of Respondent Gee's attempted 
Rule 60(b) relief, and therefore, (as was the case in Arnica), 
since the Rule 60(b) motion denial was not appealed, the Utah 
Court of Appeals erred in addressing this issue on appeal. 
Such error is in conflict with Utah law and warrants this 
Court's power of supervision. Accordingly, this Court should 
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grant Appellant Zuehlke's petition for review by a writ of 
certiorari. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT 
ZUEHLKE'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WAS JUSTIFIED AND WELL 
WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY 
POWERS. 
Assuming the Court of Appeals' reversal was a reversal 
of the trial court's order granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion 
to dismiss, the Court of Appeals erred in doing such because the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting that 
motion. This is more fully discussed in the sub-points below. 
A. The evidentiary hearing and personal contact with 
the parties gave Judge Moffat insight into these issues that 
the Utah Court of Appeals could not obtain on appeal. In 
considering the trial court's actions regarding 
Respondent Gee's conduct at the independent medical examination 
performed by Dr. Clark, it was important for the Utah Court of 
Appeals to note the order which required Respondent Gee's 
attendance at that examination. The order required Respondent 
Gee to appear at the independent medical examination in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and goes on to state, "failure to so appear will 
result in sanctions to the plaintiff, Nancy Gee, which may 
include dismissal of her action." Based upon the language of 
the order, Respondent Gee was placed on notice that if she did 
-14-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not comply with the provisions of Rule 35, sanctions would be 
imposed which might include exactly what did happen. Further, 
the order is important in that the order stands as a basis for 
the court's dismissal of her action in conjunction with Rule 37 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is further important for the Utah Court of Appeals 
to keep in mind that Appellant Zuehlke's Motion to Dismiss was 
granted after an evidentiary hearing was held on the matter. In 
that hearing, the trial court had an opportunity to determine 
the demeanor of the witnesses, the attitude with which 
Respondent Gee approached this problem, the truthfulness of her 
testimony, and all those other components that go into a 
determination as to whether or not sanctions would be 
appropriate. Judge Moffat had an opportunity to hear the 
testimony of Dr. Clark and the responsive testimony of 
Respondent Gee. It was only after hearing that testimony that 
Judge Moffat arrived at his decision to dismiss the Respondent 
Gee's action for her failure to comply with the court's order. 
Under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Judge Moffat is given discretion to impose sanctions for 
violations of discovery orders. The discretion is given to the 
trial court presumably due to the judge's ability to monitor the 
case, deal with the parties, and have personal contact with 
those parties. An appellate court loses the advantage of 
personal contact and is left to make its decisions by looking at 
a record only. For these reasons, appellate courts have 
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recognized that a trial court's discretion will be overturned 
only if there is clear reason to do so. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975). 
The Utah Court of Appeals' attention was directed to 
the exhibit submitted as part of Dr. Clark's testimony. This 
exhibit has been attached to this brief and is marked 
"Appendix C." This exhibit is a typewritten version of the 
notes taken by Dr. Clark during the examination. As he 
described in his testimony (see Transcript, page 4), this 
exhibit is a detailed version of what occurred during the 
examination. According to the exhibit, Respondent Gee failed to 
respond to virtually every question she was asked and in many 
cases not only refused to provide the information, but defied 
Dr. Clark's attempts to obtain it. A close review of Respondent 
Gee's testimony will indicate that she does not deny her failure 
to provide information, but rather she centers on the fact that 
she was present in Dr. Clark's office for a specific period 
time, as well as other matters which are irrelevant to whether 
or not she complied with the court's order to submit herself for 
an examination. Certainly, the facts indicate that Respondent 
Gee ignored the court's order, justifying the acts of the trial 
court. 
B. The requisite "intent" to justify the imposition 
of sanctions was determined by Judge Moffat and supported by the 
record. 
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In her brief to the Court of Appeals, Respondent Gee 
argued that there was no "intent" to avoid the doctor's 
questions. A review of Dr. Clark's testimony and notes leads to 
the only possible conclusion that Respondent Gee intentionally 
withheld information and refused to cooperate with Dr. Clark. 
Respondent Gee obviously went to the examination with the intent 
not to provide Dr. Clark the information and thereafter set 
about to carry out her intent. 
As Respondent Gee correctly pointed out in her brief 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, the decision regarding sanctions 
entered is a discretionary one with the trial court. The most 
recent case dealing with the discretionary powers given the 
trial court in conjunction with the dismissal of actions as a 
sanction under Rule 37 is Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In Arnica, a default judgment was 
entered against a defendant for failure to produce personal tax 
returns, among other things. The Arnica court noted that "the 
imposition of sanctions is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion." Id. 
The Arnica court further stated that it is not 
necessary that the trial court make a specific finding of 
willfulness, bad faith or fault if a full understanding of the 
issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined by the appellate 
court. Id. at 962. It is the position of Appellant Zuehlke 
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that a specific finding of fault was entered by the trial court, 
but if not, the record herein certainly supports such a finding. 
Appellant Zuehlke concedes that mere oversight or a 
non-willful violation of an order is not a sufficient basis to 
allow imposition of sanctions. However, in this case, while 
Judge Moffat did not use the word "willful," he did rule that 
Respondent Gee unreasonably failed to respond to questions 
posed to her by Dr. Lincoln Clark, thus expressly indicating 
fault. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Finding of 
Fact No. 2, Record 429.) Further, in the Minute Entry entered 
by the trial court after the hearing on July 14, 1989, Judge 
Moffat states, "It is perfectly apparent to the court that the 
defendant (sic) refused to cooperate in the ordered examination 
of her by Dr. Clark." (Record 425). The specific findings of 
fact, as well as the language of Judge Moffat's decision, 
indicate willful conduct or at least fault on the part of the 
Respondent Gee in intentionally and knowingly failing to 
cooperate in the conduct of the independent medical examination 
which had been ordered to take place in accordance with the 
provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It 
was based upon that refusal of Respondent Gee, which the court 
determined to be "unreasonable," that the court granted 
Appellant Zuehlke's Motion to Dismiss. 
In the case of First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. 
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
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The general rule is that a party in a civil 
case who refuses to respond to an order 
compelling discovery is subject to sanctions 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 
The sanctions are intended to deter 
misconduct in connection with discovery, 
and require a showing of "willfulness, bad 
faith, or fault" on the part of the non-
complying party. The choice of appropriate 
discovery sanction is primarily the 
responsibility of the trial judge and will 
not be reversed absent an abuse of 
discretion. 
Id. at 1266 (citations omitted). 
The record in this case reveals more than sufficient 
information to demonstrate a willful intent of Respondent Gee's 
refusal to provide information and at a minimum, creates fault 
on her part. The failure to provide answers was not due to her 
lack of ability to give them, nor a lack of knowledge on her 
part. The answers were not given simply because Respondent Gee, 
for whatever reason, opted not to give those answers, which was 
in direct violation of the court's order. Judge Moffat had 
every opportunity to consider her testimony, to listen to her 
explanations, as well as to listen to the testimony of 
Dr. Clark. After doing so, Judge Moffat concluded that the 
appropriate sanction would be dismissal of Respondent Gee's 
case, which is within his discretionary power. 
C. Judge Moffat did not abuse his discretion in 
dismissing Respondent Gee's action. 
The true issue in this point, therefore, is whether 
the Utah Court of Appeals erred in holding, in effect, that 
Judge Moffat abused his discretion in granting the Motion to 
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Dismiss of Appellant Zuehlke. In the case of G.M. Leasing 
Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1975), the Utah Supreme Court, in attempting to determine 
whether an abuse of discretion had taken place in that case, 
indicated that: 
. . . we should not undertake to substitute 
our idea of what is proper for that of the 
trial court. The law is stated in 5 
Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, as follows: 
Decisions reached in the 
proper exercise of such discretion 
have frequently been said not to be 
within the proper scope of appellate 
review, and it is clearly the 
ordinary practice of the appellate 
courts to refuse to review the 
exercise of such discretion except 
for abuse. 
* * * * * * 
[A] discretionary 
determination may be "reviewed" only 
in the case of "gross," "clear," 
"plain," "palpable," or "manifest" 
abuse of discretion . . . . 
Id. at 1245. 
There is ample evidence in the record to support the 
finding on the part of Judge Moffat that there was no abuse of 
discretion in deciding on the sanctions to be imposed and 
imposing them. As demonstrated by the record, Respondent Gee 
knowingly and unreasonably opted not to cooperate with Dr. Clark 
and, in doing so, suffered the very sort of sanction that the 
court warned her of in the order that required her appearance. 
There is no evidence that Respondent Gee was unable to conform 
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to the court's order, unlike many of the cases dealing with this 
subject. Respondent Gee simply chose not to cooperate with 
Dr. Clark. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, by reversing the trial 
court's order granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion to dismiss, in 
effect, decided that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
granting such motion to dismiss. Since the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion to 
dismiss, the Utah Court of Appeals erred in reversing such 
order. Such error was in conflict with prior decisions of this 
Court and the Utah Court of Appeals and is a departure from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings so as to call 
for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision. 
Accordingly, this Court should grant Appellant Zuehlke's 
petition for review by a writ of certiorari. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the authorities and discussion above, this 
Court should grant a writ of certiorari for the purposes of 
reviewing the errors made by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
reversing the trial court's order granting Appellant Zuehlke's 
motion to dismiss. 
DATED this <*?/ day of December, 1990. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
TERRY -#7 PLANT 
ERIK K. DAVENPORT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Nancy Gee, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Angela M. Zuehlke 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER OF REVERSAL 
Case No. 890718-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the order granting defendant's 
motion to dismiss is reversed and the case is remanded for 
trial or such other proceedings as the court deems appropriate, 
DATED this 21st day of November, 1990. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jacksonfjudge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX B 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
James C. Haskins (1406) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 268-3994* 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
fjjlJLULUL 
L 
Aim i 51969 ft 
HANSON EPPERSON & SMITH 
NANCY GEE, 
Plaintiff, ' 
vs. 
ANGELA M. ZUEHLKE, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL 
File No. 
Civil No. C85-4553 
Judge RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Plaintiffs/Appellants in the above-entitled matter hereby 
appeal from the provisions of the Order to dismiss entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County County, 
State of Utah, on the 14th day of July, 1989, wherein the Court 
granted the motion of defendant to dismiss District Court 
proceedings in this matter. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
JAMES C. HASKINS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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jj MAILING CERTIFICATE 
i l • ; : ; i ' 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Intent to Appeal to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to. Terry M. Plant, HANSEN, EPPERSON & SMITH, attorneys 
for Defendant, 4 Triad Center, Suite 500 j P.O. Box 2970 Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 this day of ; , 
1988. |j J* ! 
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J u l y 1 1 , 1989 UNIVERSITY 
opUTAH 
Summary of Attempted IME with Ms. Nancy Gee 
The IME with Ms. Gee was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on 6/29/89. She 
arrived on that date at my office at the University of Utah 
Medical Center at about 2:20 p.m. 
At the beginning of the interview she informed me that the 
time available was limited by the fact that she had to be at home 
by 4:00 p.m. She then remarked that she was "legally advised not 
A to say anything about the law suit". She then said, "You will 
receive a subpoena from me that will hold you for four days". 
"You are going to be a witness for me". In response to a 
request to clarify the above statements she implied that it was 
her intent to subpoena me for four days at the time of the trial 
on her case and to hold me for a period of four days as a 
witness. Further efforts were made to clarify the conditions she 
was placing upon the examination. I then asked her what she 
meant by not talking about the law suit and she responded, "I 
don't know", I then asked "What can we talk about in this 
interview?" She again responded, "I don't know". I then 
suggested further areas which she might contribute information 
about. This included a question about how she had been, what her 
condition had been like since I last saw her, and her response 
3^ was "Subpoena it". I then asked if there had been any further 
testing done on her psychological status and she responded, 
^) "Don't know, you will have to ask the doctors". When asked 
what her current day to day activities were, having in mind 
school or employment, she responded, "You can find out first of 
next week". She then added, "If you want to know what is going 
on, you will have to find it out from my doctors". I then asked 
her what her present difficulties were in her current life 
situation and her response was, "Your opinions are not time 
5) limited, therefore, there is no point in the examination". When 
asked if she still had any difficulties relating to the accident 
(\ she responded, "You will have to talk to my doctors about that". 
When asked, "Who are your doctors?", she responded "David 
Nielson, Page Heineman, and Milton Thomas". She added that Dr. 
Nielson had put her to work in his office to pay for her therapy 
and that she is in a head injury group of Page Heineman. I then 
asked "Do you feel you are getting better"? She responded, 
"You'ii have to talk to the doctors". She then made a series of 
remarks in a somewhat hostile vaguely threatening vein, as 
follows: "I wanted to be an attorney since childhood. I have 
expert opinions on childhood. I know more about you than you 
have c~ me. I have 2 1/2 boxes on you. Every defense and 
plain ^f's attorney in town has a book on you. There is a book 
floats .± around in the legal world about you". 
Department of Psychiatry 
School of Medicine 
50 .North Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City. Utah Ml32 
*) 
^ 
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In reference to my previous IME with her in May 1986 during 
which she claimed to have no memory for two years before and six 
months after the accident, I asked, "Have you recovered any 
memories from the period before the accident, have they come 
back"? Her answer was "You'll have to ask the doctors". 
She then stated that she will only talk to me about what is 
"public knowledge". "I will not talk to you about me or my 
family or the accident". She then demanded, "Can you cure head 
injury? I know I have had injury". She then added that she had 
to learn psychiatry and psychology and by inference this was in 
order to pursue her case. She then added she would not complete 
the evaluation. I asked her why she was not using an attorney to 
assist her with her case and she responded, "I know that is why 
you wanted to see me to find out my strategy", and refused to 
answer the question further. She added, "I am here because I am 
ordered. You can look at me, the Court has ordered me to appear, 
has not ordered me to speak, just to appear". She then angrily 
remarked that I had spent only ten minutes with her at her 
previous IME. I responded that this was not correct and my 
records indicated otherwise. She then commented, "You can't say 
that my mother is a liar". At another point she added that an 
attorney had told her that she didn't have to talk to me but 
would not give me the name of the attorney when asked saying, 
"That is privileged information and furthermore my attorneys 
change from day to day". She then added, "You can find out from 
Hansen, Epperson, and Smith". She then added, "I can't talk 
about my case because I am doing it, I'm the lawyer". 
At about 3:00 p.m. deciding that further efforts were futile, 
I indicated that we had best terminate the interview. At that 
point she busied herself re-moving some documents from her 
briefcase, pointing out that the reason she was late was that she 
had been down to the Court to obtain a subpoena oh me. She then 
busied herself writing on the back of the copies of the subpoena 
some statements that she would not permit me to look at or would 
not indicate what she was writing. I presume that it was a 
statement that she was officially serving the subpoena upon me 
because she added that I could expect the subpoena to be served 
more officially in due course. Her attitude throughout the 
interview was expressive of anger. She was vaguely threatening 
and at various points grandiose in her view of her control of the 
situation. My sense of futility in my efforts to engage her in a 
meaningful exchange of information had no impact upon her. 
Sincerely, 
Lincoln D. Clark, M.D. 
Professor of Psychiatry 
Adjunct Professor of Pharmacology 
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NANCY GEE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. 
ANGELA M. ZUEHLKE, ] 
Defendant. 
| FINDINGS OF FACT, | CONCLUSIONS OF LAN, | AND ORDER GRANTING 
} DEFENDANT'S MOTION | TO DISMISS | PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
I Civil No. C85-4553 
1 Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The Court having reviewed and considered the 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's case for her failure 
to cooperate and comply with the Court's Order Granting 
V 
Defendant's Motion for Further Medical Evaluation dated June 27, 
1989, and having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the 
defendant and the plaintiff, as well as an affidavit and 
supplemental affidavit of the plaintiff and the affidavit of 
Dr. Lincoln Clark. Further, the Court, having considered the 
testimony of Dr. Lincoln Clark, as well as the testimony of the 
plaintiff, Nancy Gee, at the hearing held on July 14, 1989, 
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Court ordered the plaintiff, Nancy Gee, 
to appear at the office of Dr. Lincoln Clark for purposes of an 
independent medical examination on June 29, 1989, in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
2. That the plaintiff, Nancy Gee, unreasonably failed 
to respond to questions posed by Dr. Lincoln Clark and 
otherwise failed to provide information necessary for Dr. Clark 
to complete his independent medical examination, thus rendering 
the examination meaningless. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAN 
1. That Nancy Gee's failure to properly respond to 
questions posed to her by Dr. Lincoln Clark and provide 
information to Dr. Clark, who was acting as an independent 
medical examiner in accordance with Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, constitutes a violation of this Court's Order 
dated June 27, 1989 and of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
2. That as a result of the failure of Plaintiff Gee 
to properly comply with this Court's Order, as well as the 
general provisions of Rule 35, it is appropriate that sanctions 
be entered as allowed for under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
-2-
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3. That as an appropriate sanction in accordance with 
this Court's Order of June 27, 1989, as well as Rule 37 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate that the 
plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, as a result of Plaintiff's 
failure to cooperate and failure to comply with the Court's 
Order dated June 27, 1989, all claims against the defendant, 
Angela Zuehlke, and by the plaintiff, Nancy Gee, be dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this /y day of July, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, 
postage prepaid, this /y day of July, 1989, to the following: 
Nancy Gee 
1709 East Creek Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
TMP:lrj -3-
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C?B 2 ' 1990 
\ 
Nancy Gee, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Angela M. Zuehlke, 
Defendant and Respondent 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
ORDER \ 
Case No, 890Z18-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon appellant's motion for 
an extension of time to file appellant's brief, filed 2 
February 1990. 
On 28 December 1989, the Court granted appellant's initial 
30 day extension request. Appellant now seeks a second 30 day 
extension, to 2 March 1990, to file the brief because counsel 
"has been involved in trials and hearings" and has not had the 
opportunity to complete the brief. 
Pursuant to the Court's internal procedure governing 
extension requests, a second extension is granted upon a 
showing of cause. Extensions "for cause" are granted for 
reason of emergency or unanticipated circumstances. Workload 
and/or other commitments are not sufficient grounds for a 
second extension. v 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is 
denied. , ^ *\ 
Dated this '^sA— day of February 1990. 
BY THE COURTS: 
Judcj^ Reg n a U W 
( 
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